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This paper investigates human performance on a set of selected tasks in an aviation maintenance organisation, 
where a significant prevalence of unsafe acts and conditions were observed. The methodology began with visual 
inspections of the work environment. Semi structured interviews were then undertaken to gain an insight into the 
job demands and critical issues reported by front line operators. Three representative critical tasks were then 
selected for a detailed task analysis. This fed into a task based risk assessment that mapped out safety critical 
deviations together with timelines for nominal and deviation paths.  The likelihood and severity of potential 
outcomes were estimated in terms of loss of productivity.  Task performance was assessed in terms of the 
likelihood of failure and compared with a monetised risk exposure for both nominal paths and when short cuts and 
deviations occurred. 
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1. Introduction  
   Aviation maintenance is a highly regulated industry 
which operates to the highest internationally 
recognised safety standards. However, significant 
accidents are still occurring and human factors play a 
significant role in many of them.  (Boeing 2003, and 
Hawkins 1993). 
Aviation maintenance is intrinsically very vulnerable 
to human errors as recognised by the U.S. National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1979. However, explicit 
and systematic consideration for human factors in this 
domain only started to take place around 1990 
(Mellema, 2018).   
 
Human error can be defined as the failure to complete 
a specific task that could result in scheduled 
operations interruption or damage to property and 
equipment (Reason, 1990). In aviation maintenance, 
examples of human error include the installation of 
wrong or loose parts, access panels not secured, and 
ground lock pins not removed from landing gear 
before leaving the hangar (Latorella and Prabhu, 
2000).    
 
Graber and Marx (1993) outlined 122 maintenance 
errors that took place over a 2 years period. The 
underlying issues included; omission (56%); 
installation issues (30%) wrong parts (8%), and other 
(6%). These results endorse the relevance of humans 
during aviation maintenance (Dhillon and Liu, 2007). 
A “Dirty Dozen” human factors are recognised to 
be the main causal agents of accidents in the aviation 
industry which are here summarised as;  a lack of 
communication, knowledge, teamwork or 
assertiveness, distractions, fatigue, pressure, lack of 
awareness, stress, and complacency (Mellema, 2018 
and Dupont, 1997).  
 
1.1. Background to the study  
 
This paper presents an investigation into the 
operational implications of deviations in human 
performance.  It used a set of selected tasks, 
where repeated deviations were detected in a 
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particular maintenance organisation. As the 
study developed, a cost benefit analysis was 
introduced in order to quantify costs associated 
with historical accidents and resulting  monetised 
risk exposures that organisations encounter when 
deviations and procedural short cuts occur.  This 
approach was influenced by Virovac, Domitrovic 
and Bazijanac (2017). These authors also 
investigated the prevalence of human error in an 
aviation maintenance organisation, fully 
compliant with European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) and ICAO Human Factor 
Guidelines for Aircraft Maintenance Manual 
(Doc 9859-AN/474).  
 
The participating organisation in this study,  was 
interested in how unsafe acts and shortcuts could 
create a false sense of added value. This value 
was thought to have originated from the highly 
competitive nature of the business which 
demands constant high levels of productivity and 
performance including short turnaround times 
for all maintenance interventions.  
 
A further question was how a human factors 
based approach could highlight any hidden costs 
and monetised exposure connected with the 
observed procedural short cuts and deviations. It 
was then possible to design a proactive safety 
program, aimed at increasing both productivity 
and safety for maintenance operations. 
1.2. Current data on accident and incident 
performance in the company 
  The organisation has a recent history. 
Operations started in 2009 and the focus on 
accident reporting was not fully developed till 
late 2013. Therefore it was assumed that accident 
records up to 2013 underestimates the safety 
reality of the production floor. The overall 
reporting culture in the organisation is still an 
underlying problem. The following table 
represents the number of lost time accidents per 
year with the number of aircraft which passed 
through the hangar from 2009 to 2018. 
Table 1: Representation of the number of lost time accidents 
per year and the number of aircraft through the hangars. 
Year No. of 
accidents 
No. of lost 
time accidents 
No. of aircraft 
  
2009 1 No data       No data 
2010 4 No data No data 
2011 8 No data No data 
2012 24 No data 51 
Year No. of 
accidents 
No. of lost 
time accidents 
No. of aircraft 
  
2013 17 No data 59 
2014 29 No data 61 
2015 36 No data 47 
2016 38 11 51 
2017 42 16 72 
2018 69 29 50 
 
Table 1, demonstrates a steady increase in 
accidents, but under-reporting must also be 
borne in mind. As a result of an internal safety 
awareness programme in late 2017 the most 
reliable data is from  2018. In 2018 there was a 
total of 29 accidents where the injured party was 
unfit to work for periods ranging from 1 to 55 
days. As section 5 in this paper will show, the 
financial implication of these days lost 
underlines the result that  “accidents cost 
money”.  
3. Methodology 
Figure 1 details the step by step methodological 
approach applied in this study. Data generation 
began with visual inspections of the work 
environment to observe safety related conditions 
and behaviours. A total of 77 such inspection 
were conducted. This was followed by 20 semi 
structured interviews that were undertaken to 
gain an insight into the job demands and critical 
issues reported by front line operators. Three 
representative critical tasks were then selected. 
This allowed  for detailed task analysis which 
was then fed into a task based risk assessment to 
map out safety critical deviations together with 
timelines for the nominal and deviation paths.   
Following this step, the likelihood of deviations 
were estimated along with the severity of 
potential outcomes in terms of loss of 
productivity (based on past-recorded incidents). 
Finally, task performance was fiscally assessed 
by; comparing  monetised risk exposures for 
nominal paths and alterative task flows incurred 
when short cuts and deviations were present.  
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Fig. 1. Methodological approach 
3.1 Audit of work environment and visual 
inspection step 
The audit included visual inspection and the 
collection of relevant  documentation. Visual 
inspection is defined as a traditional manual 
activity that involves careful and critical 
assessment of an object or area with reference to 
a predefined standard (Drury and Watson, 2002). 
Drury’s two stage model of inspection 
performance is the most revered and commonly 
cited within the domain of Visual Inspection. 
The model is encompassed by a ‘Search’ and 
‘Decide’ methodology. The ‘Search’ aspect of 
the model contains the investigation of an item 
or area against a pre-conceived set of standards. 
Whilst, ‘decide’ encompasses whether or not the 
fault exceeds or falls short of said standards. 
 
This study also developed checklists to 
benchmark the levels of safety compliance. 
Inspections were conducted within pre-defined 
zones, which related to areas of high incident 
rates gathered from the analysis of historical 
accident reports available (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Working Zones inspected 
Zone Position on aircraft 
1 Left wing above 
2 Left wing below 
3 Right wing above 
4 Right wing below 
5 Left engine 
6 Right engine 
7 Left landing gear 
8 Right landing gear 
3.1.1 Audit and Inspection results  
There were a total of 77 inspections conducted  
in all zones. These inspections revealed an   
overall mean level of non-compliance with 
required procedures of circa 19%. The worst 
visual inspection result recorded circa 49% non-
compliance. 
Examples of non compliance included poor 
housekeeping standards (PH), not wearing 
personal protection equipment (PPE) the 
presence of  slip, trip and fall hazards (STF)  and 
chemical safety issues . Overall levels of non 
compliance  are presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 - Number of non-conformity identified during the 
audits versus items. 
 
Poor standards of housekeeping were not only 
connected to a higher level of safety hazards. 
They also potentially related to productivity loss.  
For example tools not being in their designated 
place meant that operators had to search for the 
appropriate equipment, which in some cases was 
not available within the time window allocated to 
perform the activity. Housekeeping was 
measured in terms of high, moderate and low 
level of compliance.  Figure 2 also demonstrates 
that poor housekeeping issues were identified as 
the most prevalent safety related issue and 
observed in circa 74% of all visual inspections 
completed.  Examples of poor housekeeping also 
included tools, rags, liquid spills, electrical 
cables, and air hoses left scattered around the 
workplace, These were classified as slip, trip and 
fall hazards.   
 
The data obtained presented a number of issues 
with regards to Personal Protective Equipment 
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(PPE). High levels of non-compliance were 
observed among operators in the landing gear 
zone (Table 2). Of the 18 inspections conducted 
on the landing gear area, there were 4 instances 
of operators not wearing any eye protection 
while completing work on the landing gear. This  
allowed potential eye splashes from “Skydrol”, a 
hazardous hydraulic fluid which is able to cause 
severe eye or skin irritation requiring medical 
attention.  
 
During the semi-structured interviews, a member 
of staff reported: “if you get Skydrol in the eye, it 
feels like you have been hit on the head with a 
bat”. Accidents involving Skydrol therefore led 
to operational issues connected to delays, work 
interruptions and poor hand over as well as 
quality issues in production. 
3.2 Interview step 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) contend that semi 
structured interviews create a flexible way in 
which to structure an interview. Furthermore, 
this mode of interview allows the interviewer to 
probe and expand on areas but extract a greater 
understanding and more detailed responses. 
Hence semi structured interviews were  
employed to gain, a greater understanding of the 
domain and the human factors relating to the 
specific tasks. They were also used to probe 
possible shortcuts and deviations from required 
procedures. 
 
Interviews were conducted with 20 maintenance 
engineers with varying levels of experience and 
approvals.  Interviewees were selected on the 
basis of assuring a representative sample and 
also took into account previous accident reports 
and regulatory inspections results. 
3.2.1 Interview results  
The interview data presented an underlying 
feeling of ‘pressure’ amongst the operators, to 
complete required works within a set period of 
time, which is set by the sales team as part of the 
work scope and contractual agreement with the 
aircraft owner. 
 
The interview data also raised about the 
standards of housekeeping and their association 
with possible accidents. Furthermore, it was 
noted by one interviewee that the housekeeping 
standards had been underlined as an issue by a 
regulatory body during a routine audit.  
3.3 The Task analysis step 
Task analysis consists of investigating the 
interaction between human capabilities and a 
system in order to reach a goal.  It can increase 
productivity, identify human error and hazards as 
well as collect inputs for human reliability 
assessment (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). In 
this study task analysis was used to build a 
detailed picture of three pre-selected 
maintenance tasks before analysing them from a 
human performance perspective.    
 
Procedural tasks descriptions were derived from 
standard operating procedure manuals and 
applicable aviation authority requirements.  
Flowcharts were then used to illustrate the 
sequence of mapped steps. Potential deviations 
associated with each process step were identified 
and actual shortcuts and deviations were 
observed during the conduct of the three selected 
task. In addition each task was timed in order to 
determine the ideal duration of the process. The 
timing was performed for the nominal flow (task 
with no deviation) and for the possible deviation 
paths considered too (the execution of the each 
task with deviations). Timings were gathered 
during five repetitions of each task and path.  
3.3.1 Time task based  
By timing the process on five occasions it was 
possible to identify the mean duration of each 
nominal task and of each different deviation path 
taken. The time taken for recovery and corrective 
actions implemented was also obtained.  
3.3.1.1 Removal of the fuel filter  
During his interview, the supervisor of this task 
reported not closing a particular valve as the 
most significant deviation. This could potentially  
result  in eye injuries from a splashes of jet fuel. 
If this occurs, circa one day would be lost from; 
treating the injury, finding replacement staff and 
delays in finishing the task. 
 
This hazard can be prevented by wearing eye 
protection but the non use of PPE was observed 
in circa 60% of the time. The mean time to 
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correct this deviation by going to fetch and wear 
the PPE was 3 minutes and 40 seconds.  











3.3.1.2 Removal of the electric pump 
According to procedures the hydraulic line 
must be shut off meaning there is no pressurized 
fluid in the line. However residual skydrol can 
still exist in the general working area. The 
deviations observed in this task were; not using 
PPE during the easing of tightened nuts and 
bolts. As reported during interviews seized nuts 
can occur due to inadequate lubrication, 
corrosion or damage.  














3.3.1.3 Removal of fuel tank panel 
Seized nuts and not wearing PPE were also 
observed in this task. In this case, three different 
pieces of equipment may be necessary to remove 
nuts and bolts dependent on how easy they are to 
remove. 












4. Task based risk assessment  
4.1 Removal of an electric pump  
The electric pump itself is located in the wheel 
well of the landing gear. In completing this task 
there is again a possibility of coming in contact 
with hydraulic fluid (Skydrol). Therefore, prior 
to any works a depressurisation of the hydraulic 
system closely followed by the draining of all 
fluid in the line into the appropriate chemical 
resistant container is required. The main hazard 
during this task is eye contact with hydraulic 
fluid in the line (Skydrol). In 2018 there was 
eight such accidents. Overall this task is not 
carried out frequently but is considered high risk 
due to high volumes of hydraulic fluid present.  
 
4.2 Removal of the fuel filter element 
The removal of the fuel filter element presents 
different hazards. The removal of the filter itself 
is a fairly straightforward task, but this can lead 
to issues of complacency. The task itself should 
only take about 15mins to complete without any 
deviations. However a direct result of this  
simplicity staff tended not to wear bump caps. 
The engine cowling in the vicinity has sharp 
edges, which have proven to cause lacerations to 
the head over the years. Although not evident on 
the accident register, staff frequently reported  
hitting their head off engine cowlings during 
safety training sessions.  
 
4.3 Removal of access panels 
The removal of access panels can either be 
extremely straightforward or highly tedious. The 
process entails removing nuts, bolts, clamp rings 
and gaskets before the panel can be removed. 
Based on the timings taken, the main deviations 
observed were removing damaged or seized 
bolts.  When this occurred,  task execution times 
were delayed by up to 1 hour and 56 mins. The 
main hazard associated with this task is the 
presence of residual jet fuel. As the panels are 
being removed, this residual fuel can spill out 
resulting in either skin or eye contact. In two out 
of the five observations on removing access 
panels, staff were found not wearing protective 
eyewear. In 2018 there was a total of twelve eye 
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related accidents.  Three of these resulted in loss 
time ranging between 2 and 12 days.   
 
5. Task based risk assessment results and 
monetised risk exposure    
The two shortcuts most observed during the 
three selected tasks, were the non-usage of 
required equipment and PPE. In order to 
monetise the risk exposure for accidents due to 
these deviations, company accident data were 
analysed for 2018.     
 
The costs of accident from the accident data 
included; the salary paid to the injured party 
during absent days, the salary paid to the 
substitute operators, and all medical treatment 
related fees. The likelihood of each accident 
scenario was then calculated by dividing the 
number of relevant injuries by the number of 
aircraft passing through the organisations hangar 
during 2018.  This allowed an evidence based 
approximation of likelihood of the accident and 
resultant monetised values.   
 
5.1 Task based risk assessment results and 
monetised risk exposure results    
 
5.1.1 Removal of Fuel Filter 
Inadequate use of bump caps were observed as 
shortcuts when observing and timing the removal 
of fuel filters. During a visual inspection an 
actual accident was witnessed, whereby an 
operator struck their head on the engine cowl.  
Cowls  are commonplace on aircraft and  often 
possess sharp edges, therefore bump caps should 
be worn by operators when working in their 
vicinity. 
 
In 2018, there were 6 injuries from not wearing 
bump caps with a throughput of 50 aircraft. 
Dividing these two variables leads to an 
estimated likelihood of 12%. Furthermore, the 
mean cost of the injuries from not wearing bump 
caps was estimated to be circa €1,711.  
 
It was further found that injuries from not 
wearing bump caps resulted in circa one hour of 
delay due to locating a qualified substitute 
operator to complete the task. In comparison The 
time taken to get the bump cap is less than 8 
minutes from task timings, which denotes a cost  
of  €1.17. This value represents 0.07% of the 
total cost of the injury. 
 





















5.1.2 Removal of Electrical Pump 
For the removal of the access panel, the lack of 
eye protection was identified as a shortcut 
resulting in the potential for eye injuries from 
contact with hydraulic fluid. In 2018,  there were 
15 such accidents.  The estimated likelihood of 
such accidents comes to 30%  and meant costs  
were circa  €1,197.78.  
 
There were also productivity losses from due to 
some 1.5 hours of delays again from locating 
suitably qualified substitute operators to 
complete the task. The maximum time estimated 
to procure and wear eye protection was found to 
be 4 minutes, costing the company €1.38. This 
value is some  0.12% of the total cost of such 
accidents.  























5.1.3 Removal of Access Panel 
The shortcut observed here was not wearing the 
gloves while performing the panel removal 
activity. Panel removal is likely to expose the 
workers to droplets of corrosive chemicals used 
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as lubricants. Contact with such corrosive 
chemicals can cause skin irritation and burns. 
 
In 2018 five such accidents were recorded 
involving skin burns.  The estimated likelihood 
was calculated at   around 10%. The estimated 
cost associated to this type of injury was circa 
€842.19.  
 
For this type of accident delays cam to about 2 
hours again for the locating and briefing 
qualified substitute operators to complete the 
task. The time taken to get the required gloves is 
less than 8 min. This represents a cost of €0.82 
for the company or 0.09% of the cost associated 
to the overall injury. 
 
 

















1.02 hrs 0.1  
€842.19 
2 hrs 
5.2 Observations about lack of PPE compliance 
During the measurement of the task timings, all 
operators observed were not wearing bump caps 
when required. 60% of the operators were not 
wearing eye protection when required and 40% 
of the operators were not wearing gloves when 
required. 
 
Lu et. al. (2015) reports that the non-conformity 
of PPE usage, can be linked with company 
factors such as lack of supervision, and 
insufficient educational programs to show the 
consequence of workers not wearing PPE. 
Moreover, it can be associated with personal 
factors such as culture, gender, age and 
education level. According to Lombardi, Verma 
and Brennan (2009),  the non-compliance with 
eye wear requirements can be associated with 
lack of comfort, logging and scratching of the 
eyewear. They also reported a lack of safety 
training as a contributing factors for non use of 
eye protection.  
 
This study found that mean times taken for 
operator to procure the right required equipment 





Shortcuts and deviations are examples human 
factor, issues affecting the safety and quality of 
aviation maintenance tasks. This study 
investigated the costs and delays to a sub set of 
tasks where short cuts and deviations were 
observed.   
 
Personnel perceived themselves to be under 
pressure and therefore willing to use ‘acceptable 
shortcuts’ to achieve targets. However, the short 
cuts did not save money or increase productivity. 
Based on the cost benefit analysis completed, 
there was little evidence of productivity gains by 
using shortcuts. Furthermore a high number of 
accidents occurred due to these shortcuts which 
if prevented, would have saved the organisation 
time and money.   
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